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I. Introduction  
The standard treatment of labor market discrimination by Becker (1974) assumes that firm owners have a 
"distaste" for blacks. In equilibrium firms tradeoff the disutility of black employment for profits, resulting 
in wage differential between equally qualified black and white workers. In this paper, whether or not a 
whiteowned firm discriminates against black labor is determined by a genetically programmed behavioral 
phenotype. It is maintained that such a genetic embedding is plausible if fitness maximization is an 
objective of the human species. Tastes for discrimination are cast in an evolutionary context, where 
individual firms desire to maximize their fitness. Given that genetic inheritance processes evolve slowly, 
one could in principle object to using a genetic model of the firm to evaluate discrimination. However, 
following Ursprung (1988), one can argue that the greatest part of human history to date, has been 
characterized by situations in which man has lived under the permanent threat of death. It it reasonable 
therefore to view preferences as having evolved through the process of natural selection.  
II. A Model of Duopsonistic Competition  
The market consists of a large and finite population of whiteowned sole proprietorships that produce an 
identical output. The firms compete in random pairwise duopsony contests. Both firms compete against 
each other for two units of homogeneous of black labor. The competition is stylized as a "fitness" contest in 
the sense that each firm needs at least one unit of black labor to produce a good that enhances fitness. In 
particular, the two firms are concerned with maximizing Darwinian fitness, defined as the conditionally 
expected number of offspring. It is assumed that each firm owner breeds true, all offspring are male, and 
have the identical behavioral phenotype of the parent. Each unit of produced output sells for a constant 
price of one, which is equal to the marginal cost of production. It is assumed that the expected number of 
offspring for the firm owner is proportional to firm profit, and that in the absence of profit, Darwinian 
fitness is zero. Each unit of black labor has a constant marginal product, and the firm's have a production 
function given by q = Lr, where q is output, L is labor input, and r > 0 is a parameter measuring the 
elasticity of output with respect to black labor input. The wage that firms pay black labor is determined by 
a behavioral phenotype that is genetically programmed. Two phenotypes are possible. A firm can either 
have a phenotype that makes it not discriminate against black labor by paying a wage equal to its marginal 
product, or a firm can have a phenotype that makes it discriminate against black labor by paying a wage of 
one half of its marginal product. It is assumed that each unit of black labor has no opportunities for firm 
ownership, and that their fitness depends upon obtaining employment with one of the whiteowned 
duopsonists. Given that a firm discriminates and the rival does not, the rival firm bids away all the labor in 
the market, and the discriminating firm is unable to achieve fitness. This is a "loss of fitness" cost, and it 
captures the essence of strategic interactions in the labor market that may characterize duopsony.  
Given the two possible behavioral phenotypes, two types of strategists are possible in the population of 
firms. Firms that are genetically programmed to pay black labor one half of its marginal product are 
"Illiberal" strategists, and firms that are genetically programmed to pay black labor its marginal product are 
"Liberal" strategists. An equilibrium in this model will be characterized by each firm offering a wage to 
black labor that maximizes fitness. In principle, there are four possible outcomes, and the equilibrium that 
emerges requires a solution concept. The approach adopted below will allow the equilibrium to depend 
upon genetic behavioral phenotypes the owners of the firms have.  
III. Equilibrium and Invadability with Asexual Reproduction  
For random pairwise contests between firms, the gains to Darwinian fitness are a function of the behavioral 
phenotype and returns to scale. What are plausible equilibrium outcomes of this fitness contest? If we 
appeal to rationality on the part of each firm, gametheoretic solution concepts are not helpful. Under 
rationality, an environment characterized by perfect information will not permit a stable equilibrium in 
random fitness contests in the sense that no best response or undominated strategies will emerge in the 
absence of some evolutionary mechanism. Thus, a genetic embedding of behavioral phenotypes permits 
coherent equilibrium outcomes in the sense that pairwise strategies in the population of firms will be stable 
or unstable according to the gains to Darwinian fitness realized by each strategy.  
Suppose the initial population of firms consists of Illiberals, and a rare mutant Liberal phenotype appears. 
Under constant returns to scale can these Liberals successfully invade the population? Let the number of 
these mutant Liberals in the population be p ε (0, 1). In random contests between two firms, the probability 
that an opponent will be a Liberal (Illiberal) strategist is p (1  p ). Two propositions for this game follow 
below.  
Proposition 1: Under perfect competition where r = 1, the population of Illiberal strategists is stable 
against invasion by mutant Liberal strategists.  
If the population of Illiberals is to be stable against invasion, the Darwinian fitness of Illiberals must be 
greater than that of Liberals. Let the Darwinian fitness of Illiberals and Liberals be F(I) and 
F(L) respectively, then under constant returns to scale, evolutionary stability of the population of Illiberals 
requires that F(I) > F(L) where:  
F(I) = p × 0 + (1  p )(1r .50r)  
F(L) = p (1r  1) + (1  p )(2r  r2r )  
If r = 1, π (I,L) = π (L,L), thus evolutionary stability requires (1  p )π (I,I) > (1  p )π (L,I), or:  
(1  p ).50 > 0  
Thus, for p < 1, the population of Illiberal strategists is stable against invasion by Liberal strategists. The 
Illiberal strategy is also an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), defined as a strategy such that if, all 
members of the population adopt it, no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of 
natural selection [Maynard Smith, 1982]. Thus, a market environment characterized by constant returns to 
scale in production does not provide conditions favorable for invasion by Liberal firms.  
Proposition 2: If r is approximately.1988, the population of Illiberal strategists is not stable against 
invasion by mutant Liberal strategists.  
When r < 1, the fitness functions for Illiberals and Liberals are respectively:  
F(I) = (1  p )(1r .50)  
F(L) = p × (1r  1) + (1  p )(2r  r2r ) = (1p)(2r  r2r )  
Invadability by Liberals requires:  
(1  r)2r > 1 .50r  
Taking the natural log of both sides, the difference F(L)  F(I) is:  
Differentiating D with respect to r and solving will yield the value of 
r that maximizes the difference between F(L) and F(I) for r ≠ 1.:  
simplifying results in the approximate quadratic equation:  
 
with positive roots of approximately .1988 and 2.8014. The second order condition is negative with respect 
to r =.1988, which establishes that the maximum positive distance between F(L) and F(I) occurs when there 
are decreasing returns to scale. Thus, Liberal mutant firms can invade the population of Illiberals when 
there are decreasing returns to scale in the sense that any existing population of Illiberal firms, when r 
=.1988, is not evolutionary stable. In general, there is a range of values for r < 1, such that F(L) > F(I). 
Proposition 2 merely establishes the existence of an r that permits Liberal firms to invade.  
IV. Natural Selection and Replicator Dynamics  
The ESS emphasizes the role of mutation, indicating the conditons under which rare phenotypes can invade 
a population. If a rare phenotype is favored by natural selection, than the next generation will include such 
phenotypes. To characterize replicator dynamics, it is assumed that reproduction is continuous. It is also 
assumed that background fitness is zero, and that the profit of each firm results in a gain to fitness that 
exceeds the constant date rate of δ in the population of firm owners. The difference between profit and the 
death rate δ, determines the birth rate of firms. For a given state of the population, the payoff to a pure 
strategy, and hence the gain to fitness is simply π (i,j). Two propositions characterizing natural selection 
follow below.  
Proposition 3: In a duopsonistic labor market with incumbent Illiberals, if there are constant returns to 
scale in production the market cannot be populated in the longrun by Liberals.  
For an initial population of Illiberal strategists with constant returns to scale, the number of Illiberals (nI ) 
and Liberals (nL ) will grow over time according to:  
 
 
Given the solutions for n*I and n*L, the limit of the ratio n*L /n*I is:  
 
where noL and noI are defined at t = 0.  
Proposition 4: In a duopsonistic labor market with incumbent Illiberals, if r =.1988 (decreasing returns to 
scale) the market cannot be populated in the longrun by Illiberals.  
Under decreasing returns to scale, Darwinian fitness for Liberal firms is positive. If r =.1988, the number of 
Illberals and Liberals will grow over time according to:  
 
 
The limit of the ratio n*L /n*I is:  
 
V. Conclusion  
The approach adopted here is neither new or novel, per se. It does however cast further theoretical insight 
upon how evolutionary processes can alter the traditional neoclassical outcomes where agents are presumed 
to be rational actors. As Lane, Malerba, et. al (1995) argue, rationality imposes stringent conditions upon 
the agents involved in a choice situation. In particular, neoclassical models usually offer a representation of 
context as a choice situation without any consideration as to where the representation comes from. To 
model discrimination as a taste is in a sense a representation without representation. If however, Darwinian 
fitness is a relevant context for the human species, then to paraphase Mitchell (1995), evolution is a 
representation of context that provides a method of searching among an enormous number of possibilities 
for maximizing fitness. By embedding tastes in behavioral phenotypes that evolve through natural 
selection, a more coherent context is provided for explaining the choices and behaviors that agents make in 
the marketplace.  
By modelling wage discrimination in an evolutionary framework, at least two insights about the nature of 
such behavior are revealed. First, discrimination need not be pathological, or based on pure bigotry. The 
results here suggest that discrimination by white firm owners against black labor represents a favorable 
adaptation that promotes Darwinian fitness, in a given technological environment. Finally, the results show 
that wage discrimination need not be based on rationality, where firm owners efficiently tradeoff black 
employment for profit. In evolution, the efficiency promoting mechanism is not rational utility 
maximization per se, instead it is natural selection.  
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